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INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this study was to examine Bayes' Theorem 
as a model for the description of how humans utilize infor-
mation based on uncertain (probabilistic) relationships be-
tween the relevant cues and the outcome-classes (refer to 
Appendix I for definitions of technical terms). More speci-
fully, the purpose was: 
1. To examine Bayes' Theorem as a possible model 
of the way humans modify subjective probability 
estimates. 
2. To investigate an assumption made by Beach 
(1966) and Sterner (1966) that conformance of a 
person's subjective probability estimates to 
Bayes' Theorem is best shown at a very low level 
of estimate accuracy since the person is "con-
strained'' to respond according to the objective 
conditional probabilities when his estimates are 
more accurate. 
3. To investigate the effects of limiting the 
range of probability estimates so that the sub-
jective probability estimates are required to 
follow the law of probability theory that requires 
2 
the estimates for the complete set of outcome classes 
to add to unity (or 1000~). 
The theoretical work of Egon Brunswik (1943, 1947, 
1952, 1956) forms the basis for a large part of the litera-
ture related to probabilistic concept formation. Brunswik's 
Probabilistic Functionalism Theory views the human being as 
operating in a complex environment where specific cues are 
not perfectly correlated with any specific outcome-class. 
Our perceptions then, are based on a combination of several 
cues which are related in an uncertain manner to more than 
one object-class. Allport (1955), when discussing Brunswik's 
theory, attributes the probabilistic relationship to environ-
mental ambiguity. Therefore, perceptions are, at best, un-
certain situations in which decisions are arrived at on the 
basis of partially valid clues through some kind of weighting 
process. Brunswik (1943) theorizes that the subject arrives 
at a "best wager" through an evaluation of the trustworthiness 
of the respective cues. 
Various studies (Estes & Straughan, 1954; Friedman, 
Burke, Cole, Keller, Millward & Estes, 1964; Greene, 1962; 
and Messick & Solley, 1954) indicate that humans are capable 
of learning to respond to many probabilistic situations with 
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a fair degree of accuracy. In the simplest cases subjects 
were asked to respond to a single cue dimension (e.g., light) 
with two variations (e.g., light on and light off). Each 
cue was presented according to a predetermined objective 
probability and the subjects were asked to "guess'' which 
cue (light) would be presented on the next trial. In more 
complex cases, several cues (e.g , lights) were used in a 
procedure identical to the simpler two cue case. The sub-
jects were asked to predict which cue would be presented on 
the next trial. The results showed that, given enough ex-
perience with the cue-criterion universe, humans are capable 
of responding in a fashion which closely approximates the 
objective probabilities which were set up prior to the ex-
periment :fPr two or more variants on a single cue dimension. 
In more complex cases, where there have been more than 
one cue dimension, two basic approaches have been used to 
study probabilistic concept formation. These two approaches 
have been 1) correlation and multiple regression and 2) prob-
ability theory. In the correlational approach several cue 
dimensions are established which have predetermined correla-
tions with the criterion variable. The subjects are asked 
to predict an outcome after they have been given cues. 
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Feedback is given on each trial and it is hypothesized that 
this experience with the cue-criterion universe will enable 
the subjects to learn the correlations between the cues and 
the criterion-outcomes. The measure of this learning is a 
correlation computed between the subjec~s responses and the 
respective cue dimensions. 
The experiments based on probability theory generally 
consisted of the presentation of cues from each of several 
cue dimensions, each of which bears a predetermined condition-
al probability relationship to two or more outcome-classes. 
It is hypothesized here that the subjects will learn the 
conditional probability relationships of the various outcome-
classes given each cue. The extent of learning is examined 
by a comparison of the subjects responses to test trial items 
with the objective conditional probabilities. 
In a correlational study by Summers (1962) three cue 
dimensions were used, with each dimension having eight values. 
Correlations were imposed between each of the three simulta-
neously presented cues (one value from each dimension) and a 
variable, correct line length, whose magnitude varied with 
the magnitude of all three cues. A detailed explanation may 
be found in Summers (1962, pp. 31-32). The resulting three 
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correlations, or cue weightings, were compared with response 
weightings derived from correlations taken between the sub-
jects responses and the correct line length. The hypotheses 
were that the rank order of utilization of the three cues 
would come to conform to the rank order of the cue validites 
and that the magnitude of the response weightings would ap-
proach the magnitude of the cue weightings. The results in-
dicate that the first hypothesis was upheld, but evidence 
for the second hypothesis is weak since a plateau of learn-
ing had not yet been reached. 
In another correlational study by Uhl (1963) the subjects 
were presented with a stimulus display consisting of one lit 
light bulb in each of three rows of colored lights. The 
appearance of the board was likened to a "profile" of test 
scores. A multiple regression prediction equation was used 
to determine which criterion light would be shown to the sub-
ject. That is, each light was given numerical value and the 
combination of those values according to the prediction equa-
tion was used to determine which criterion light was used. 
The task, then, was for the subject to learn to predict which 
criterion light would appear, given the three displayed val-
ues on the three cue dimensions. The degree of prediction 
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attained by the subjects was measured by Pearson produce-
moment correlation between the criterion values and the 
subject responses. The results indicated that subjects 
were able to attain a fair degree of accuracy of prediction. 
In summary, then, the correlational studies, as ex-
emplified by Summers (1962) and Uhl (1963) indicate that 
humans are able to respond reasonably accurately to cues 
bearing uncertain relationships to the outcome-classes. 
An early experiment using probabilistic cues was 
performed by Goodow (1954) . Subjects were presented with 
three cues with probabilities of 1.00, 0.67, and 0.67. On 
the fifth block of 100 trials, subjects' responses followed 
the 1.00 cue about 89°/o of the time and followed the 0.67 
cues about 86°/o of the time. When two cues were presented 
simultaneously the results were the same as the 1.00 cue 
presented singly when the cues agreed, but when the cues 
were in conflict, subjects tended to follow the 1.00 cue 
only 87°/o of the time. The conflicting cues reduced cer-
tainty, but it was noted that subjects tended to rely on 
the 1.00 cue more and more as the number of trials increased. 
When subjects were given two 0.67 cues they gave the correct 
answer 90"/o of the time when both cues pointed to the same 
answer and 50"/o of the time when the cues were conflicting. 
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In more complex experiments, Beach (1964, 1966) has 
used more than one cue dimension and more than two outcome-' 
classes. In the first experiment by Beach (1964) the sub-
jects were required to place 120 cards into three outcome-
classes. The predictions were made on the basis of the 
presentation of three cue values drawn from three cue dimen-
sions each of which contained nine elements. Special cue 
combinations for which the objective probability values 
indicated one outcome-class and which had another outcome-
class designated as correct were purposely included in the 
deck. From the outset, the subjects' responses were in-
creasingly more accurate for the cards in which the objective 
probabilities agreed with the designated correct class. For 
the other cards, however, persistent errors were made during 
the first part of the experiment. These errors were pri-
marily substitutions of the probability based class choice 
for the designated "correct" class. The results support the 
notion that subjects can learn probability relationships in 
complex situations. 
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All of these studies indicate that a human is capable 
of learning complex probabilistic concepts based on multiple 
cue dimensions. These studies, however, were not designed to 
give any information about the process by which the subjects 
analyzed and combined the data presented to them. That is, 
they were not designed to show the mechanism used to process 
the information and to reach a decision about outcome-class 
membership. When the subject is first exposed to the cue-
criterion universe his responses cannot be expected to 
approximate the objective predetermined probability relation-
ships between the cues and the outcome-classes. However, if 
the subjects' responses reflect how he perceives those proba-
bility relationships, then there may be some kind of model 
which will show the interrelationships between the cues and 
the class-outcomes. Just exactly what type of model this 
will be is still open to question. 
Bayes' Theorem has been proposed as the appropriate 
normative model to describe human subjective probability esti-
mate revision behavior. Edwards, Lindman, and Phillips (1965, 
p. 275) define a normative model as "a set of rules specify-
ing what people should do." Therefore, Bayes' Theorem is a 
normative model for decision making in that it tells what 
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decision should be made given certain data. The equation for 
Bayes' Theorem in its simplest form is: 
p (H/n) = p (Dia) p (H) 
p (D) 
(1) 
where P (H) is the prior probability of the outcome-class 
under consideration being correct; P (D/H) is the probability 
of the data being associated with the outcome-class; P (D) 
is the prior probability of the data occurring; and P (H/D) 
is the revised posterior probability that the outcome-class 
is correct, given the data associated with it. 
The lack of interest in the use of Bayes' Theorem in 
the past has been due to the difficulty, if not impossibility, 
of making objective probability judgments prior to the data 
collection. More recently, a new group has emerged, called 
neo-Bayesians, who are willing to allow the use of subjective 
probability estimates for the prior probabilities rather than 
insisting on objective probabilities in unexplored areas. 
These subjective prior probabilities are based on knowledge, 
experience, and intuition. 
Stilson (1966) raises a question about mathematical 
rules for subjective probabilities. An assumption is made 
that subjective and objective probabilities obey the same 
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mathematical combination rules when these two kinds of proba-
bilities are used together in the same equation, as do the 
neo-Bayesians. The present study was done under the assump-
tion that the subjective probabilities obey the same rules 
that bind conventional probabilities. That is, the rules for 
the manipulation of conventional probabilities are also as-
sumed to be the rules which govern subjective probability 
estimates. 
Subjective probability, as used in this study, will 
be equivalent to what Edwards, ~ al (1965) refer to as a 
11 personalistic view. 11 The estimate indicates the likelihood 
of a specific outcome-class occurring when specific cues 
have been presented. Any statement of probability is said 
to be a matter of personal opinion and can be associated only 
with the individual stating that opinion. This definition of 
subjective probability, then, emphasizes the individual only 
insofar as his experience or knowledge differs from other 
individuals. The implication is that individuals start from 
different points due to their differing backgrounds but share 
a common method for processing information they receive. 
Edwards, et al (1965) suggest that while an individuals ini-
tial opinion may differ from a neighbor's opinion, both opin-
ions may be made to coincide through exposure to a series of 
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relevant observations so as to become nearly identical and so 
as to be considered objective when the opinions are derived 
from completely adequate data. 
Beach (1966) utilized Bayes' Theorem as a normative 
model of probabilistic concept formation. In this study he 
examined revision consistency which was defined as the degree 
of consistency between the subjects' paired cue estimates and 
the Bayesian combination of their single cue estimates. That 
is, revision consistency is the degree to which the two sides 
of the equation for Bayes' Theorem (1) approach equality when 
subjective prior probabilities are revised to obtain posterior 
subjective probabilities. 
In order to simplify the procedures and the computa-
tions Beach used a modified form of Bayes' Theorem. If each 
outcome-class is equally represented, and therefore, equally 
probable, the Bayesian relationship may be reduced to 
p (H/d) C( p (d/H) (2) 
which states that the subjective probability of an outcome-
class given a specific cue is proportional to the subjective 
probability of the cue given the outcome-class. When more 
than one cue is available and the cues are independent the 
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simplified Bayesian relationship is 
(3) 
which states that the subjective probability of an outcome-
class given three cues is proportional to the product of the 
subjective probabilities of each cue given an outcome-class. 
A substitution from equation (2) into equation (3) yields: 
(4) 
which states that the subjective probability of an outcome-
class given three cues is proportional to the product of the 
probabilities of the outcome-classes given each cue. Equa-
tion (4) shows the form of Bayes• Theorem used in Beach's 
study. 
In experiment (1) by Beach, capital letters, numbers, 
and small letters were used as cue dimensions with colors 
designating the outcome-classes. Subjects were shown com-
binations of three cues, one from each dimension. The cues 
were probabilistic indicators of the "correct" outcome-class. 
To construct the set of cards Beach used only a subset of the 
possible set of cue combinations. This method was justified 
on the basis of limited subject exposure to the cues, even 
though independent cue dimensions are not produced. Beach 
changed this procedure for experiments (2) and (3) to include 
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all possible sets of cues. 
Beach stated that accurate knowledge of the proba-
bilistic relationships of the cues and outcome-classes would 
constrain the subjects to be consistent and therefore, the 
experiment was designed to reduce accuracy so that confoxmance 
to Bayes' Theorem would be more clearly indicated by revision 
consistency. 
Beach's first experiment had three experimental con-
ditions: (1) two outcome-classes, (2) three outcome-classes, 
and (3) six outcome-classes. The subjects were informed 
that all classes were equally represented and would be pre-
sented in random order. The cards were shown one at a time 
and the subjects were asked to make outcome-class identifi-
cations on the basis of the cues presented. After the choice 
had been made the "correct" class was identified and then the 
next card was presented. All subjects went through two 
presentations of the card deck for their training condition. 
After training, the subjects were tested using cards possess-
ing single cues and pairs of cues which were intermixed. The 
manner of presentation was the same as for the training trials 
except that the correct class membership was not revealed. 
The subjects were asked to make probability estimates for 
each of the possible classes by sliding markers along an 
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unmarked 25 inch bar. All classes were estimated on the bar 
at one time so that the outcome-class estimates were forced 
to add to unity. Subjects made second estimates for five 
of the test cards in order to obtain a measure of reliability. 
Only the five subjects having the greatest reliability were 
used in the revision consistency analysis. 
Through the use of equation (4), correlations were 
obtained between the subjects paired-cue estimates and the 
product of their single cue estimates to measure revision 
consistency. Beach also obtained accuracy measures for 
paired cue estimates and single cue estimates by correlating 
the subjects subjective estimates for each cue with the ob-
jective probabilities for the same cue. 
The revision consistency analysis for experiment (1) 
gave results that Beach considered positive support for the 
Bayesian model. Beach reported only the consistency correla-
tions. Whether or not these subjects who had the highest re-
liability correlations also had the highest consistency cor-
relations is not reported. Of the 15 consistency correlations 
13 are significant at or beyond the .05 level. The lower 
correlations for the six class condition are explained as 
probably the result of increased confusion and opportunities 
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for error when estimating probabilities for six classes. 
Single cue accuracy and paired cue accuracy correlations were 
.46, .31, .34, and.04, .06, .14 for the two, three and six 
class conditions, respectively. 
Beach's (1966) second (2) experiment was to investi-
gate the assumption that fluctuations in the accuracy of 
subjective probability estimates should not influence re-
vision consistency. Fluctuations in accuracy were ass1.lmed 
to be caused by forgetting and additional training. The 
training procedure was identical to experiment (1) except 
that subjects were shown the deck four times so that a great-
er degree of accuracy could be obtained. The cards from the 
three class condition of experiment (1) were used. The sub-
jects were divided into two delay groups and were tested 
after two and five days. After the delay the subjects were 
tested, given one training trial and then retested. Since 
decreases in accuracy were not as great as expected some of 
the subjects from both groups were asked to return two months 
later. This attempt to decrease accuracy was unsuccessful in 
that the decrease was non-significant. Beach correlated the 
changes from one test session to another for reliability, 
revision consistency, and accuracy. The only significant 
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result was a positive correlation between changes in revision 
consistency and changes in reliability. This result was 
said to support the notion that reliability sets an upper 
limit for revision consistency but does not insure high con-
sistency. His results showed a great deal of variation in 
revision consistency at high levels of reliability while at 
low levels of reliability the variation of revision consis-
tency was much less and tended toward low revision consistency. 
Experiment (3) by Beach (1966) had two basic objec-
tives. The first was to examine the subjects' revision of 
deck probabilities and second, to examine the reliability of 
the subjects' class choices for the training cards compared 
to their subjective estimates on the test cards. 
Revision of estimates was examined in the same way as 
in experiment (1). A three outcome-class, two dimensional 
universe was used. The mean revision consistency correlation 
was 0.79. 
Revision of deck (objective) probabilities was inves-
tigated by showing the subjects bar graphs of the actual cue-
outcome-class relationships for single cues and then asking 
them to make estimates of probabilities for pairs of cues. 
The results showed that 13 of 32 subjects simply averaged 
the objective probabilities. The 19 subjects who did not 
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average had a mean revision consistency correlation of 0.96. 
In the discussion of the experiments Beach concluded 
that the results support the notion that "subjects possess a 
rule for revising subjective probability estimates which they 
have at the moment; whether the probabilities are derived 
from experienced relative frequencies or from displayed proba-
bilities, whether they are accurate or inaccurate, whether 
they have just been learned or whether they are residuals of 
partially-forgotten values learned days before. Through all 
of these variations in the accuracy of their subjective proba-
bilities the subject's rule remains unchanged." Beach sug-
gested that his results have shown Bayes' Theorem to be the 
revision rule used. 
Sterner (1966) performed two experiments to try to 
generalize some of Beach's results. Experiment (1) utilized 
43 college undergraduates who were shown cards which pictured 
"spacemen". These spacemen were made up from three cue 
dimensions each of which had four values. The dimensions 
were body shape, color, and leg shape. Sixty-three cards 
were used to make equally represented, and therefore, equally 
probable classes. The class membership was determined by a 
method used by Beach and includes all possible combinations 
of cues which insures independent cue dimensions. 
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The training trials procedures were essentially identi-
cal to the procedures used by Beach (1966) in experiment (1). 
The test trials required the subjects to estimate the proba-
bility that the information shown on the test card, a part 
of or a whole spaceman, indicated each of the three outcome-
classes. After the experiment the subjects were questioned 
as to their impressions of the number of spacemen in each 
outcome-class. The data from those who felt that the classes 
were equally represented were used in a Bayesian analysis 
I 
with the rest of the data used in a comparison non-Bayesian 
analysis, since the data from this group did not meet the 
assumption of equal class representation required by the 
simplified form of the Bayes' Theorem equation. 
Experiment (2) was identical to experiment (1) except 
that the subjects were told in the training instructions that 
the classes were equally represented and therefore, no ques-
tionnaire was used. Fourteen subjects participated in this 
experiment. 
Sterner considers the results from experiment (1) as 
not supporting the Bayesian revision rule as a normative model. 
Of the 19 subjects in the Bayesian analysis, only eight ob-
tained consistency correlations significantly different from 
19 
zero. The mean revision consistency correlation for all 19 
subjects was 0.53, with the mean revision consistency corre-
lation for the 11 high reliable subjects 0.55. In the non-
Bayesian group, eight out of 18 subjects obtained significant 
revision consistency correlations. The mean revision con-
sistency correlation was 0.50 for all subjects and 0.53 for 
the high reliable subjects. Accuracy for single cues and 
combined cues remained low throughout the experiment. The 
data from experiment (2) was similar. 
Sterner (1966, p. 49) concludes "the results do not 
support the hypothesis. Subjective probabilities for the 
combined cue stimuli cannot be said to be highly consistent 
Bayesian combinations of the subjective estimates for the 
corresponding single cue stimuli." 
The present study was designed to test as assumption 
made by Beach (1966) and Sterner (1966) that subjects would 
be constrained to be consistent if they were allowed enough 
experience with the experimental universe to become highly 
accurate in their estimations, and to investigate the effects 
of a difference in the limits of the subject's probability 
estimations between the Beach and Sterner studies. This study 
followed the general model of Beach's (1966) experiment (1) 
20 
to examine Bayesian revision consistency. Specifically, the 
hypotheses were as follows: 
(1) subjects whose probability estimates for each 
outcome-class add to unity will have higher 
revision consistency correlations than subjects 
whose estimates are not required to add to 
unity; 
(2) there will be no difference between the revision 
consistency correlations of subjects when the 
accuracy of estimation is low and the revision 
consistency correlations of the same subjects 
at a higher level of accuracy; and 
(3) the subjects' combined cue estimates will 
correlate 0.70 or more with the product of the 
single cue estimates. 
The difference between the results obtained by Beach 
(1966) and Sterner (1966) leaves the question of the appro-
priateness of Bayes' Theorem as a normative model unanswered. 
Since the study by Sterner was not a replication of that of 
Beach there are several possibilities for the differences in 
the results of the two experiments. First, the cues which 
were used in the two studies were quite different. The 
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spacemen used by Sterner could be viewed as a whole entity 
whereas the letters and numbers used by Beach could not. 
Second, in Beach's experiments the subjects were required to 
have their estimates add to unity while in Sterner's experi-
ment the estimates were not required to add to unity. Third, 
Beach examined consistency of revision for pairs of cues 
while Sterner used combinations of three cues. 
The present study was designed to examine the effects 
of the conditions of adding to unity or not adding to unity 
which were placed on the probability estimations. Sterner 
concludes that some degree of consistency of estimation should 
be expected when the subjects' estimations are required to 
add to unity since the last estimation is, in a sense, fixed 
by the previous estimations. 
The assumption by Beach and Sterner that revision by 
Bayes' Theorem is best shown at low levels of accuracy was 
also examined. Beach (1966) states that high accuracy of 
estimation "constrains" the subject to respond consistently. 
It would seem, however, that consistency of revision should 
be essentially constant whether the subject has low or high 
accuracy of estimation. Beach and Sterner both state that 
subjects seem to use some sort of revision rule and they 
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stick to that rule whether or not their estimates are accurate. 
If it is the case the subjects do use the same rule through-
out any learning situation involving probabilistic cues, then 
the consistency of revision should be independent of accuracy 
and, therefore, should not vary widely over trials. 
METHOD 
Subjects 
The subjects used for this study were 29 students 
enrolled at Yakima Valley College spring quarter, 1967 in 
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a Philosophy class. The students were told that their part-
icipation was not required but that attendance would be 
greatly appreciated. Due to absenses and/or incomplete test 
forms the data from twenty-tW'.' students was found to be valid 
for the proposed analyses. 
Apparatus 
The experimental universe consisted of sixty-three 
7~ x 9~ cards. Each card had a combination of cues, one 
cue from each of three dimensions, which was identified as 
a spaceman and each card carried a class label on the reverse 
side. The cue dimensions were: 1) the geometrical shape 
used for the body of the spaceman, 2) the color of the space-
man, and 3) the shapes of the legs. Each dimension consisted 
of four cues which were: 1) the body shapes of square, circle, 
triangle and cross; 2) the colors of red, orange, blue and 
green; and 3) the leg shapes of dashed lines, wavy lines, 
straight lines with cross-hatches, and continuous lines 
which slant out and curve up at the ends. The spacemen were 
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assigned to outcome-classes which were the planet names of 
Mars, Pluto, and Moon. (Ref er to Appendix II for sample 
drawings of the spacemen.) 
The cue combinations and outcome-class assignments 
were identical to those used by Sterner (1966). Appendix III 
shows the cue combinations and outcome-class assignments that 
comprised the experimental universe. Table I shows the 
breakdown of the cue-to-class assignments by relative frequency. 
The entire deck of sixty-three cards was used in each 
of the five training trials. The cards used for the test 
trials consisted of three spacemen from the training deck 
and nine cards containing the single cues which comprised 
the three spacemen. Appendix IV shows the order of presen-
tation of the test trial cues for each of the five days. 
Subject responses were recorded on pre-printed answer 
sheets. Responses for the training trials consisted of 
circling one of the three outcome-class names; Moon, Mars, 
or Pluto: for each of the sixty-three training deck cards. 
The test trial responses for the subjects whose probability 
estimates were required to add to unity consisted of the 
three outcome-class names beside which they were to write 
the respective estimates. The test trial responses for the 
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TABLE I 
Frequency Distributions for Cue Values Associated With 
Each Class and the Corresponding Probabilities 
of the Classes Given Each Cue 
CLASS BODY SHAPE 
Circle Cross Triangle Square 
MARS: f 3 2 7 9 
p (Class/cue) .19 .12 .44 .60 
PLUTO: f 8 10 1 2 
p (Class/cue) .so .63 .06 .13 
MOON: f 5 4 8 4 
p (Class/cue) .31 .25 .50 .27 
COLOR 
Red Yellow Blue Green 
MARS: f 9 2 4 6 
p (Class/cue) .56 .12 .25 .40 
PLUTO: f 3 3 9 6 
p (Class/cue) .19 .19 .56 .40 
MOON: f 4 11 3 3 
p (Class/cue) .25 .69 .19 .20 
LEG SHAPE 
Dashed Wavy Lines with Lines which 
Lines Lines crossmarks curve UE 
MARS: f 5 13 1 2 
p (Class/ cue) .31 .82 .06 .13 
PLUTO: f 10 1 4 6 
p (Class/cue) .63 .06 .25 .40 
MOON: f 1 2 11 7 
p (Class/cue) .06 .12 .69 .47 
treatment group whose estimates were not reauired to add to 
unity consisted of placing a mark and an estimate number on 
a straight line continuum with a 11 0" marked on the extreme 
left and a "100" marked on the extreme right. Refer to 
Appendix V for samples of the training trials and test trials 
forms. 
Procedure 
The subjects met as a class in their classroom during 
the regular class hour. The experimenter stood behind a table 
at the front of the class. A hollow portable speaking dais 
was used as a shield behind which the training deck cards 
and the test cards were kept when not being viewed by the 
subjects. When the subjects were settled and the pre-printed 
answer sheet-instruction booklet was passed out the subjects 
were asked to read the training trial instructions carefully. 
These instructions contained a general introduction to the 
experiment and an explanation of the task they were being 
asked to perform. Then a short set of oral directions was 
given to all subjects. They were told that the cards con-
tained all of the information that they would need to iden-
tify the planet to which each spaceman belonged. The task 
was to learn how to use the information to identify the 
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spaceman's correct planet. It was pointed out that at the 
outset they would be guessing but that they should make 
choices regardless. (Refer to Appendix VI for the specific 
instructions.) The experimenter answered questions and the 
training trials began. 
The experimenter held each card at shoulder level for 
five seconds. It was then removed from view for five seconds 
and the subjects were asked to circle their answers. The 
card was raised again, long enough to allow the experimenter 
to identify for the subjects the correct outcome-class 
(planet). After the card had been presented, it was placed 
upside down in a discard pile out of sight of the subjects. 
Each day, after the training trials the subjects were 
asked to read the instructions for the test trials. When 
they had finished reading_, a short set of oral instructions 
were given. The subjects were told that they would see all 
of a spaceman on some cards and only parts of the spaceman 
on other cards. They were asked to estimate the probability 
that the spaceman, or the part of the spaceman was from each 
of the three planets. A basic definition of probability was 
also included in the directions. Specific instructions for 
each of the two treatment groups were also included. One 
2'8 
group was instructed that their estimates must add to 100 
while the other group was not limited in their estimations. 
(Refer to Appendix VII for specific test instructions.) 
The subjects were given a sample trial and questions were 
answered. The subjects were asked to "Estimate the proba-
bility that the body shape 'cross' indicates that a space-
man is from Moon, Mars, or Pluto;" for example. Each card 
was held in view for 20 seconds while the subjects wrote 
down their estimates. 
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RESULTS 
The purpose of this experiment was: (1) to examine 
the assumption of Beach (1966) and Sterner (1966) that sub-
jects are most apt to make responses which correspond to 
predictions made by Bayes' Theorem when the accuracy of 
their estimates are low, (2) to investigate the effects of 
two methods of recording probability estimates, and (3) to 
examine whether subjects are highly consistent (revision 
consistency correlation of 0.70 or more) according to the 
model provided by Bayes' Theorem. The general model of the 
experiment was Beach's (1966} experiment {l). The major 
departure from this model was allowing the subjects more 
than the minimal experience allowed by Sterner and Beach. 
~hat is, the subjects were allowed enough experience with 
the experimental universe to gain a degree of accuracy of 
estimation. 
Two major analyses were used. To determine revision 
consistency, Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients 
were obtained between the subjects' combined cue estimates 
and the Bayesian predictions based on the products of the 
estimates for the three corresponding single cues. The re-
vision consistency correlations are presented in Table II. 
TABLE II 
Revision Consistency Correlations For the Ba.yes' Theorem Model 
Day# 
1 2 3 4 5 
Treatment Sutaects 
1. • 486 .875 a, b o 914 a, b 0817 a, b 0716 a, b 
2. 0608 .389 .662 .567 0721 a, b 
3. • 916 a, b .902 a, b .972 a, b .937 a, b .317 
4. .599 .532 .916 a, b .845 a. b .828 a, b 
5. 0362 .857 a, b • 965 a, b .920 a, b o 968 a, b 
6. .207 .701 a, b .956 a, b 0953 a, b .726a, b 
7. .825 a, b .634 .900 a, b .684 a 0806 a, b 
100',,6 8. .687 a .845 a, b .741 a, b • 751 a, b .766 a, b 
(n=l2) 9. .217 .242 .661 .887 a, b .789 a, b 
10. .657 .073 • 463 .700 a, b • 777 a, b 
11. .797 a, b .804 a, b 0730 a, b 0982 a, b .719 a, b 
12. .858 a, b • 779 a, b • 923 a, b • 744 a, b .654 
x = 0602 x = .636 x = 0817 x = .816 x = .732 
1. .184 • 802 a, b .645 0046 .587 
2. .164 .413 • 935 a, b o 950 a, b • 954 a, b 
3. • 799 a, b .954 a, b .424 • 868 a, b • 924 a, b 
4. .634 .630 .889 a, b .401 .296 
not 5. .241 0192 0243 .846 a, b 0931 a, b 
100% 6. .955 a, b • 968 a, b • 988 a, b .662 .845 a, b 
(n=lO) 7. .608 .707 a, b • 904 a, b .903 a, b .566 
8. .789a, b .502 0496 .056 .723 a, b 
9. .852 a, b .700 a, b .882 a, b • 941 a, b .837 a, b 
10. 
.347 .017 .392 .741 a, b .629 
x = .588 x = .589 x = .680 x = 0641 x = .728 
a = significant correlation (r!o.666, PS•05) b = correlation 2 0.700 
w 
0 
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In the treatment requiring the single cue estimates to add to 
unity the mean correlations ranged from 0.602 to 0.817. The 
number of significant correlations for this treatment ranged 
from five out of twelve for the first day to eleven out of 
twelve on the fourth day, and the nwnber of correlations ex-
ceeding 0.70 ranged from four out of twelve on the first day 
to ten out of twelve on the fourth and fifth days. In the 
treatment not requiring the single cue estimates to add to 
unity, the mean correlations ranged from 0.588 on the first 
day to 0.728 on the fifth day. The number of significant 
consistency correlations ranged from five out of ten on the 
first day to six out of ten on the fourth and fifth days, and 
the number of consistency correlations over 0.70 ranged from 
four out of ten on the first day to six out of ten on the 
fifth day. 
The second major analysis is a single factor repeated 
measures analysis of variance (Table III) which used the re-
vision consistency correlations of the first analysis for scores 
and which tested the first and second research hypotheses con-
cerning the assumption made by Sterner and Beach that the 
accuracy of estimation must be kept at low levels and con-
cerning the effects of two different methods of recording 
Source 
Treatment .180 
Error (a) 1.862 
Between Ss 
Days .556 
Days x 
Treatments olll 
Error (b) 4.169 
Within Ss 
Total 
*p ~ .05 
TABLE III 
Single Factor Repeated Measures Analysis of 
Variance For the Bayesian Model 
Sum of Squares d.f. Mean Square 
1 .180 
20 • 093 
2.042 21 
4 .139 
4 .028 
80 .052 
4.837 -ie 
6.764 109 
F 
1. 938 
2.670• 
.537 
w 
"' 
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probability estimates. The only significant result of this 
analysis was the F value of 2.670 (with 4 & 80 d.f .) for the 
main effect which tested differences over Days of Trials. 
A matching analysis of the subjects' responses was 
done using an additive model in place of Bayes' Theorem. 
The consistency correlations (Table IV) for the treatment 
whose estimates were required to add to unity ranged from a 
mean of 0.655 for the first day to a mean of 0.858 on the 
fourth day. The number of significant correlations ranged 
from six out of twelve on the first day to eleven out of 
twelve for the third, fourth and fifth days and the number of 
correlations over 0.700 ranged from six out of twelve on the 
first day to ten out of twelve for the third, fourth, and 
fifth days. The consistency correlations for the treatment 
not requiring estimates to add to unity ranged from a mean 
value of 0.647 for the first day to 0.737 for the fifth day. 
The number of significant correlations ranged from five out 
of ten to seven out of ten on the fourth day and the number 
of correlations over 0.700 was five out of ten for all five 
days. The single factor repeated measures analysis of vari-
ance using these revision consistency correlations as scores 
yielded no significant results (Table V). Figure I shows a 
TABLE IV 
Revision Consistency Correlations For the Additive Model 
Day# 
1 2 3 4 5 
Treatment 
l. .539 .861 a, b .978 a, b • 968 a, b • 962 a, b 
2. • 740 a, b .454 .697 a .549 .696 a 
3. • 909 a, b • 825 a, b .963 a, b 0951 a, b .616 
4. .634 .613 0819 a, b .931 a, b .827 a, b 
100% 5. 0428 0815 a, b .965 a, b .943 a, b o 977 a, b (n=l2) 6. .487 .861 a, b .959 a, b .959a, b .782 a, b 
7. • 966 a, b .785 a, b • 917 a, b .729 a, b .822 a, b 
8. • 810 a, b .880 a, b • 943 a, b o 849 a, b 0955 a, b 
9. .460 .092 .750 a, b 0976 a, b • 917 a, b 
10. 0279 .100 .124 .666 a 0910 a, b 
11. • 755 a, b .874 a, b .858 a, b • 960 a, b • 704 a, b 
12. .856 a, b .830 .982 a, b .821 a, b .812 a, b 
x = .652 x = .665 x = .830 x = .858 x = 0832 
1. .787 a, b o 797 a, b .666 a .196 .555 
2. .130 0674 a • 996 a, b • 995 a, b 0957 a, b 
3. .657 .951 a, b .369 .834 a, b .917 a, b 
4. .661 0568 .957 a, b .365 .392 
not 5. .326 0167 .290 .761 a, b .963 a, b 
100% 6. • 955 a, b • 962 a, b • 983 a, b .681 a 0784 a, b 
(n=lO) 7. .894 a, b • 948 a, b • 915 a, b 0851 a, b .890 a, b 
8. .796 a, b .460 .662 .140 .695 a 
9. .862 a, b • 875 a, b .882 a, b .900 a, b .629 
10. .401 .oo4 .516 .689 a .589 
x = .647 x = .64. x = 0734 x = .641 x = .737 
a= significant correlation ( r2o.666, p,S 0.05) b =correlation z 0.70 w 
~ 
Source 
Treatment .223 
Error (a) 2.261 
Between Ss 
Days .415 
Days x 
Treatments .149 
Error (b) 3.716 
Within Ss 
Total 
TABLE V 
Single Factor Repeated Measures Analysis of 
Variance For the Additive Model 
Sum of Squares d.f. Mean Square 
1 .233 
20 .113 
2.484 21 
4 .104 
4 .037 
Bo .o46 
4.280 - 88 -
6.764 109 
F 
1.973 
2.233 
.802 
w 
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comparison of the mean correlations for the Bayesian analysis 
and the additive analysis by treatment group over the five 
days of trials. 
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DISCUSSION 
The purpose of this study was (1) to investigate the 
effects of limiting the range of probability estimates so 
that the subjective probability estimates are required to 
follow the law of classical probability theory that requires 
the estimates for the complete set of outcome-classes to add 
to unity {lOC°fe); (2) to investigate an assumption made by 
Beach (1966) and Sterner (1966) that conformance of a per-
son's subjective probability estimate revision to an estimate 
based on Bayes' Theorem is best shown at a low level of 
accuracy since the person is "constrained" to respond accord-
ing to the objective conditional probabilities when his 
estimates are more accurate; and (3) to determine the number 
of subjects who have been defined as highly consistent be-
cause their revision consistency correlations equal or ex-
ceed 0.70. Bayes' Theorem is a mathematical statement which 
is a rule for the revision of an objective probability state-
ment on the basis of new information (data) • The neo-
Bayesians have taken this revision rule for objective proba-
bilities and have proposed that the rule may be of some value 
in unexplored areas if subjective probability estimates 
based on experience and/or intuition are substituted for the 
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objective prior probabilities. In this way, they combine 
subjective estimates with objective probability statements 
derived from experimental data to obtain a new 11 objective 11 
probability statement. 
On the basis of his results, Beach (1964, 1966) con-
cludes that Bayes• Theorem can be used to describe the rela-
tionship between the subjects• estimates for multiple cue 
combinations and the Bayesian revision of the subjects' 
estimates for the respective single cue components. Sterner's 
(1966) results, on the other hand, do not support Bayes' 
Theorem as a description of the process by which humans re-
vise probability estimates as they acquire new information. 
Sterner (1966) has defined the minimum requirements 
necessary to support Bayes• Theorem as a descriptive model 
of human revision behaviors as "all men" being highly con-
sistent in terms of the conformance of the multiple cue 
estimates to the Bayesian revision of the component single 
cue estimates. 
Highly consistent is further defined as having a re-
vision consistency correlation which is, at the least, sig-
nificantly greater than zero. A further restriction not 
stated explicitly by Sterner is that the model being con-
sidered should provide a more accurate prediction than any 
alternative models can provide. 
In the present study a consistency correlation of 
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0.70 was chosen as the minimum revision consistency correla-
tion acceptable as highly consistent since this value is 
greater than the significant value for the degrees of freedom 
present in this analysis and it accounts for at least 49°fe of 
the variance of the regression between the combined cue esti-
mates and the combination of the respective single cues. All 
of the revision consistency correlations were used as scores 
in the analysis of variance. 
The results of the analysis of variance are shown in 
Table III. The non-significant F value for the differences 
between the two treatments indicates that the differences 
between Sterner's results and Beach's results are not attribu-
table to the two different methods of recording the subject's 
probability estimates. According to this analysis there are 
no reliable differences between the consistency correlations 
for the group whose probability estimates were required to 
add to 100% and the group whose estimates were not required 
to add to 1000fe. These results may be artifactual, however. 
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The results obtained by Sterner indicate that the 
students who were placed in the non-100"/o treatment in this 
study may have been more knowledgeable about probability than 
would be expected from a random sample of undergraduate stu-
dents. Several of these subjects made their estimates con-
sistently add to 1000/o. Inspection of the means for each 
treatment-day cell shows that the mean cell values for the 
100"/o treatment range from 0.602 on the first day to 0.817 on 
the third day while the range for the non-1000/o treatment means 
ranged from 0.588 on the first day to .728 on the fifth day. 
These means show a definite trend toward higher consistency 
by the treatment group whose responses were somewhat con-
strained by the requirement of addition to 1000/o. This trend 
supports the contention by Sterner {1966) that Beach's posi-
tive results are partially the result of methodology and not 
completely due to the process of combination going on within 
the subject. 
The significant Days {or Trials) effect indicates that 
the changes in the revision consistency correlations between 
low accuracy (first day) and a higher level of accuracy 
(fifth day) are greater than could be expected through ran-
dom sampling. This result does not support the second 
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research hypothesis. Both Beach (1964, 1966) and Sterner 
(1966) assume that high accuracy "constrains" the subjects 
to respond according to the objective probabilities and, 
therefore, revision consistency is best shown at low levels 
of accuracy. If this is the case, then revision consistency 
should have been at least as high at the lowest level of 
accuracy as it is at the higher levels of accuracy. 
It seems reasonable to assume that the single cue 
estimates and the combined cue estimates were of approximate-
ly the same accuracy at any given point in time in the experi-
ment. If this was the case, and if the subjects used the 
same model throughout the five days, then the revision con-
sistency would have been detennined primarily through the 
use of some model and revision consistency would have been 
essentially constant over the five days. Since the results 
indicate that this was not the case, the assumptions made 
should be examined. The assumption that the single cue 
estimates and the combined cue estimates were approximately 
equal is the most suspect. Since no measures of accuracy 
were obtained, there is no factual basis for asserting that 
these estimates were, in fact, approximately equal in accuracy. 
Variance in the degree of accuracy between the three single 
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cue estimates and the combined cue estimate could result in the 
substantially lower revision consistency correlations obtained 
during the first two or three days of the experiment. The 
results suggest, then, that the assumption by Sterner (1966) 
and Beach (1964, 1966) was not upheld, but a lack of data 
concerning the accuracy of the subjects' estimates makes this 
non-support weak. 
The third hypothesis is descriptive in nature. The 
results pertaining to this hypothesis are contained in Table 
II. Each correlation designated with a "b" equals or exceeds 
the 0.70 specification. The number of correlations 0.70 or 
above range from a low of four out of 12 and four out of ten 
on the first day to ten out of 12 and six out of ten on the 
fifth day for the 1000/o group and the non-1000/o group respec-
tively. These results tend to confirm Sterner's statement to 
the effect that Beach's results supporting Bayes' Theorem as 
a normative model are partially artifactual because of the 
restriction that all estimates had to add to 100% (unity) • 
The non-1000/o treatment group remained low throughout the 
entire experiment with a high of six out of ten consistency 
correlations over 0.70. The 1000/o treatment group, on the 
other hand, except for the first day which had four out of 
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12 correlations over 0.70, had somewhat higher correlations 
with seven, nine, ten, and ten out of 12 consistency corre-
lations over 0.70 for the second through fifth day, respec-
tively. 
Analyses identical to the analyses used for the Bayes-
ian model were also done on the subects' estimates utilizing 
an additive model suggested by Sterner (1966) as a possible 
alternative to Bayes' Theorem. The repeated measures analy-
sis of variance (Table IV) using revision consistency corre-
lations based on a simple addition of the three single cue 
estimates yielded no significant differences, although the 
Days (Trials) effects approached a significant level. Table 
V presents the individual and mean revision consistency cor-
relations for the ten treatment-day cells as well as indica-
tors of significant correlations and correlations which equal 
or exceed 0.70. 
As in Bayesian analysis, the 1000/o treatment group tend-
ed to be more consistent with the additive model than the 
non-1000/o group. The mean correlations for the corresponding 
cells in the Bayesian analysis and the additive analysis tend 
to be higher for the additive analysis but with only small 
differences. 
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The general congruence between the data analyses for 
the Bayesian and the additive models leaves a problem of 
interpretation of the results. With both models having ap-
proximately equal support on the basis of the data from 
Sterner (1966) and the present study, a problem Sterner (1966) 
points out with the correlational analysis used in his study 
and in the present study should be considered if a decisive 
decision is to be made as to which model is the most appro-
priate. If the objective conditional probabilities are such 
that the weightings assigned to each pair of single cue and 
combined cue estimates for each model are very nearly the 
same, then the correlational analysis does not have enough 
discriminative power to choose between the two models. There-
fore, the conditional probabilities associated with the single 
cues must be structured so that weightings assigned to each 
estimate through the correlational procedure are more widely 
separated. The correlational analysis can be made even more 
powerful by using conditional probabilities that not only 
provide a larger differences between the weightings but also 
predict a different rank order for each of the models under 
consideration. Sterner (1966) gives a hypothetical example 
to illustrate this point. Tables VI and VII show how the 
Class 
Bayesian Model 
1 
2 
3 
Additive Model 
1 
2 
3 
TABLE VI 
Hypothetical Probability Estimates for 
Classes Given Single Cues 
Cue 
A B c 
(. 30) x (. 60) x (. 50) = 
(. 20) x ( .10) x (. 25) = 
(. 50) x (. 30) x (. 25) = 
.30+ .60+ .so 
.20+ .10+ .25 
.50+ .30+ .25 
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.090 
.005 
.038 
1.40 
.55 
1.05 
TABLE VII 
Revised Hypothetical Probability Estimates With 
Differential Weightings and Rank Orders 
Class Cue 
Bayesian Model 
1 (. 80) x (. 01) x (. 80) = .006 
2 ( .19) x (. 65) x (. 20) = .025 
47 
3 (. 01) x (.30)x ( .01) = .00003 
Additive Model 
1 .80+ .01+ .80 = 1.61 
2 .19+ .65+ .20 = 1.04 
3 .01+ .30+ .01 = .32 
48 
probability distributions could be modified to overcome the 
limitations of the correlational analysis used. Table VI 
shows hypothetical probability estimates for classes given 
single cues in which the weightings and the rank order posi-
tions predicted are the same for the Bayesian model and for 
the additive model. Table VII shows a new hypothetical dis-
tribution of probabilities which provide both a wider range 
of weightings and a different rank order for each model. 
This new distribution allows the correlational analysis to 
distinguish between the two models more clearly and thereby 
provides more definitive evidence as to which model is actu-
ally being used by the subjects. 
The problem of what is the appropriate model for hu-
man probability estimation behavior, then, is still in ques-
tion. Methodological problems with this and previous studies 
do not allow a decisive choice to be made. When the subjects' 
responses are structured so that their estimates are required 
to add to 10D°fe (unity), consistency with either the Bayesian 
or the additive model is somewhat higher than when there are 
no restrictions on the estimates, although these differences 
are not consistently large enough to be significant. This 
difference is probably due to a "narrowing" of the range of 
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probability for the three outcome-classes since estimates 
would probably be made consciously for two of the outcome-
classes with the third estimate being made primarily on the 
basis of the restriction of addition to unity. In other 
words, the subject probably concentrated on two of the out-
come-class estimates and the third estimate was more or less 
"detennined" since the three estimates were required to add 
to 10C°fe. The mean consistency correlations range between 
0.588 and 0.817 for the Bayesian analysis and between 0.641 
and 0.858 for the additive analysis. At the best, these 
models account for 73.6% of the variance of the regression 
between the combination of single cues and the combined cue 
estimates and only 31.1% of the variance of regression at the 
worst. 
The weaknesses of this study fall into three major 
categories. First, the lack of discrimination on the part of 
the correlational analysis due to the relatively closely 
spaced conditional probabilities used in this study and by 
Sterner (1966) and Beach (1966) does not allow a definitive 
choice to be made between the Bayesian and the additive model. 
Second, the absense of a difference between the two treatments 
used in this study indicated a trend, but were not conclusive 
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due to several subjects who were apparently somewhat know-
ledgeable about classical probability and they limited their 
estimates to 100% consistently over the five days. Third, 
although the assumption by Beach (1966) and Sterner (1966) 
concerning revision consistency at low levels of accuracy 
was not upheld, the results here are weak. Measures of accu-
racy for the single cue and combined cue estimates would have 
indicated whether the lower revision consistency correlations 
obtained during the first two or three days were caused by 
large differences in accuracy between each of the three single 
cue estimates and the combined cue estimates. 
Future research to determine whether Bayes' Theorem is 
the appropriate model for the process by which humans process 
probabilistic information and to validate the use of the "all 
men" generalization will require several things. First, the 
revision consistency correlations should meet the minimum 
requirements of (1) being significantly different from zero, 
and (2) accounting for at least 500/o of the variance of re-
gression. To avoid possible confusion, a probability dis-
tribution should be constructed which produces distinct 
weightings {and, to make the analysis more powerful, different 
rank orders) for each model under consideration. In this way 
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the correlational analysis will be able to differentiate 
between the two models with more sensitivity than has been 
possible in past studies. To further enhance the "all men" 
requirement for a normative model future studies should follow 
Sterner's (1966) example in not restricting the probability 
estimates in any way since evidence suggests that many people 
do not limit their probability estimates to 10C>°fe (unity) as 
classical probability theory demands. 
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ABSTRACT 
The study investigated (1) Bayes' Theorem as a model 
of human probability revision behavior, (2) the effects of 
limiting the range of probability estimates, and (3) an as-
sumption by Beach (1966) and Sterner (1966) that low estima-
tion accuracy is required to show conformance to Bayes' 
Theorem. Twenty-two undergraduate college students were 
given five training and five test trials using "spacemen" 
as cues and planets as criterion. Revision consistency 
correlations between the Bayesian prediction based on single 
cue components of the spacemen and combined cue estimates, 
for the whole spaceman, were computed and an analysis of 
variance using these correlations was done. A similar analy-
sis was done for an additive model. The results (1) were 
inconclusive due to the structure of the cue-universe proba-
bilities; (2) non-significant, but in the direction expected; 
and (3) significant, and not supporting the hypothesis. 
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APPENDIX I 
Subjective probability estimate: Opinion expressed by a 
subject as to his "certainty" of the relationship 
between a cue and an outcome-class. The opinion is 
based on knowledge, experience, and/or intuition. 
Objective probability: An expression of certainty in terms 
of frequency of occurrence of a given cue outcome-
class combination. 
Cue-Criterion (or outcome-class) universe: The set of or 
subset of all possible combinations of cues and out-
come-classes which are being used in a particular 
experiment for training and/or testing subjects. 
Outcome-Class (=Criterion): A category of some type which 
is chosen for a specific combination of cues. (For 
example, the outcome-class "chair" is chosen for an 
article made of wood with four legs, a seat, and a 
back.) 
Bayes' Theorem: A mathematical expression for the revision 
of a conditional probability based on new data. 
Prior probability: Either a subjective estimate or an objec-
tive probability before it undergoes revision by 
Bayes' Theorem. 
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Posterior probability: The revised probability that results 
from a combination of new data and the prior proba-
bility by Bayes' Theorem. 
Single cue estimate: A subjective estimate of probability 
for a value of a single cue dimension. 
Combined cue estimate (paired cue estimate): An estimate of 
subjective probability based on a combination of a 
single cue value from each of two or more cue 
dimensions. 
Cue-dimension: A group of cues which form some sort of a 
"coherent" whole (e.g., color, numbers, letters, 
body shapes, etc.) 
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EXPERIMENTAL UNIVERSE 
The cues formed objects referred to as spacemen. The 
spacemen were divided into the classes of Mars, Pluto and 
Moon. The cues were the body shapes of circle, square, 
triangle and cross; the leg shapes of dashed lines, wavy 
lines, straight lines with cross marks, and continuous lines 
which slanted out and curved up at the bottom; and the body 
colors of red, orange, blue and green. The figures below 
show all of the cues except those in the color dimension. 
I 
I \ 
I \ 
I \ 
I \ 
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The Cue Combinations and Class Assignments That Comprised 
The Experimental Universe* 
Cue Combinations Class cue Combinations Class 
Al I Pluto Cl I Mars 
Al II Mars Cl II Mars 
Al III Moon Cl III Moon 
Al IV Moon Cl IV Mars 
A2 I Pluto C2 I Moon 
A2 II Moon C2 II Mars 
A2 III Moon C2 III Moon 
A2 IV Moon C2 IV Moon 
A3 I Pluto C3 I Pluto 
A3 II Mars C3 II Mars 
A3 III Pluto C3 III Moon 
A3 IV Pluto C3 IV Moon 
A4 I Pluto C4 I Mars 
A4 II Mars C4 II Mars 
A4 III Pluto C4 III Moon 
A4 IV Pluto C4 IV Moon 
Bl I Pluto Dl I Mars 
Bl II Mars Dl II Mars 
Bl III Moon Dl III Mars 
Bl IV Pluto Dl IV Mars 
B2 I Pluto D2 I Pluto 
B2 II Moon D2 II Mars 
B2 III Moon D2 III Moon 
B2 IV Moon D2 IV Moon 
B3 I Pluto D3 I Mars 
B3 II ;Pluto D3 II Mars 
B3 III Pluto D3 III Moon 
B3 IV Pluto D3 IV Pluto 
B4 I Pluto D4 I Mars 
B4 II Mars D4 II Mars 
B4 III Pluto D4 III Moon 
B4 IV Pluto 
*Cue dimension key 
Body shapes: Body colors: Leg shapes: 
Circle A Red 1 Dashed 1 
Cross B Orange 2 Wavy II 
Triangle c Blue 3 Cross marksIII Square D Green 4 Curved up IV 
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Test Trial Cues and Cue Combinations 
Order of Presentation 
Day l 
1. Cross-hatched legs 
2. Square body 
3. Wavy legs 
4. Red, triangular bodied, wavy legged spaceman 
5. Cross body 
6. Triangle body 
7. Red color 
8. Green, square bodied, dashed legged spaceman 
9. Dashed legs 
10. Green color 
11. Blue color 
12. Blue, cross bodied, cross hatched legged spaceman 
Day 2 
1. Wavy legs 
2. Green, square bodied, dashed legged spaceman 
3 • Square body 
4. Red color 
5. Blue color 
6. Blue, cross bodied, cross-hatched legged spaceman 
7. cross-hatched 
8. Cross body 
9. Triangle body 
10. Red, triangle 
11. Green color 
12. Dashed legs 
Day 3 
legs 
bodied, wavy legged spaceman 
1. Red, triangular bodied, wavy legged spaceman 
2. wavy legs 
3. Cross-hatch legs 
4. Dashed legs 
5. Red color 
6. Blue color 
7. Green, square bodied, dashed legged spaceman 
8. Square body 
9. Blue, cross bodied, cross-hatch legged spaceman 
10. Cross body 
11. Triangle body 
12. Green color 
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Day 4 
1. Triangle body 
2. Blue color 
3. Cross-hatch legs 
4. Square body 
5. Wavy legs 
6. Triangular bodied, wavy legged, red spaceman 
7. Blue, cross bodied, cross-hatched legged spaceman 
8. Dashed legs 
9. Green color 
10. Red color 
11. Cross body 
12. Green, square bodied, dashed legged spaceman 
Day 5 
1. Cross bodied 
2. Blue, cross bodied, cross-hatch legged spaceman 
3. wavy legs 
4. Green, square bodied, dashed legged spaceman 
5 • Square body 
6. Blue color 
7. Triangle body 
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8. Red color 
9. Green color 
10. Cross-hatch legs 
11. Dashed legs 
12. Red, triangular bodied, wavy legged spaceman 
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1. Mars 2. Mars 3. Mars 4. Mars 5. Mars 6. Mars 
Pluto Pluto Pluto Pluto Pluto Pluto 
Moon Moon Moon Moon Moon Moon 
7. Mars 8. Mars 9. Mars 10. Mars 11. Mars 12. Mars 
Pluto Pluto Pluto Pluto Pluto Pluto 
Moon Moon Moon Moon Moon Moon 
13. Mars 14. Mars 15. Mars 16. Mars 17. Mars 18. Mars 
Pluto Pluto Pluto Pluto Pluto Pluto 
Moon Moon Moon Moon Moon Moon 
19. Mars 20. Mars 21. Mars 22. Mars 23. Mars 24. Mars 
Pluto Pluto Pluto Pluto Pluto Pluto 
Moon Moon Moon Moon Moon Moon 
25. Mars 26. Mars 27. Mars 28. Mars 29. Mars 30. Mars 
Pluto Pluto Pluto Pluto Pluto Pluto 
Moon Moon Moon Moon Moon Moon 
31. Mars 32. Mars 33. Mars 34. Mars 35. Mars 36. Mars 
Pluto Pluto Pluto Pluto Pluto Pluto 
Moon Moon Moon Moon Moon Moon 
37. Mars 38. Mars 39. Mars 40. Mars 41. Mars 42. Mars 
Pluto Pluto Pluto Pluto Pluto Pluto 
Moon Moon Moon Moon Moon Moon 
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43. Mars 44. Mars 45. Mars 46. Mars 47. Mars 48. Mars 
Pluto Pluto Pluto Pluto Pluto Pluto 
Moon Moon Moon Moon Moon Moon 
49. Mars so. Mars 51. Mars 52. Mars 53. Mars 54. Mars 
Pluto Pluto Pluto Pluto Pluto Pluto 
Moon Moon Moon Moon Moon Moon 
55. Mars 56. Mars 57. Mars 58. Mars 59. Mars 60. Mars 
Pluto Pluto Pluto Pluto Pluto Pluto 
Moon Moon Moon Moon Moon Moon 
61. Mars 62. Mars 63. Mars 
Pluto Pluto Pluto 
Moon Moon Moon 
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TEST TRIALS 
1. Mars 2. Mars 3. Mars 
Pluto Pluto Pluto 
Moon Moon Moon 
4. Mars s. Mars 6. Mars 
Pluto Pluto Pluto 
Moon Moon Moon 
7. Mars 8. Mars 9. Mars 
Pluto Pluto Pluto 
Moon Moon Moon 
10. Mars 11. Mars 12. Mars 
Pluto Pluto Pluto 
Moon Moon Moon 
SAMPLE TRIAL 
Mars 
Pluto 
Moon 
SAMPLE TRIAL 
Mars 
Pluto 
Moon 
1. 
Mars 
Pluto 
Moon 
2. 
Mars 
Pluto 
Moon 
3. 
Mars 
Pluto 
Moon 
4. 
Mars 
Pluto 
Moon 
No Probability 
No Probability 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
TEST TRIALS 
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Certainty 
100 
100 
100 
Certainty 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
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5. No Probability Certainty 
Mars 0 100 
Pluto 0 100 
Moon 0 100 
6. 
Mars 0 100 
Pluto 0 100 
Moon 0 100 
7. 
Mars 0 100 
Pluto 0 100 
Moon 0 100 
8. 
Mars 0 100 
Pluto 0 100 
Moon 0 100 
9. 
Mars 0 100 
Pluto 0 100 
Moon 0 100 
10. 
Mars 0 100 
Pluto 0 100 
Moon 0 100 
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11. No Probability Certainty 
Mars 0 100 
Pluto 0 100 
Moon 0 100 
12. 
Mars 0 100 
Pluto 0 100 
Moon 0 100 
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR TRAINING TRIALS 
Most college men who are over 6 feet 8 inches tall 
and who wear lettermen sweaters are basketball players: but 
some are not. If we were forced to make a decision based on 
the information given, we would probably classify such a 
person as a basketball player. Our daily lives are filled 
with choices based on uncertain information. For example, 
does tail wagging indicate that this dog is friendly? Does 
an east wind and dark skies indicate rain? 
This experiment will investigate how we make these 
kinds of judgments. It will involve a game in which we are 
going to pretend that three spaceships have landed on campus. 
These spaceships are each from a different planet: one from 
Mars, one from Pluto, and one from the moon. You will be 
shown cards containing pictures of the spacemen. Each card 
contains some of the information that you will need to tell 
where the particular spaceman came from, i.e., Mars, Pluto, 
or Moon. Your task in this experiment is to learn how to use 
the information presented on the cards, just as you have 
learned that height and lettermen sweaters are good indicators 
of basketball players. 
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You will see each card for five seconds. After I 
remove it from view you must immediately classify the space-
man according to the planet he comes from by writing in the 
name of the planet on the answer sheet provided. There will 
be a three second delay before I identify the correct planet 
so that you may be sure to make a choice. At the beginning 
you will have little information upon which to base a choice; 
you will only be guessing; please make a choice regardless. 
Even if you are not at all sure, answer each time. 
Please look up when you have finished reading these 
instructions. There will be some oral directions given now. 
After these instructions you may ask questions. 
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Training Trials (Oral) 
This is how it will work. Please do not mark your 
answer sheet yet. First, I will show you the card for five 
seconds--do not answer during this time; then I will remove 
it from view for three seconds and say "Circle your answer". 
You must makr an answer during this time. Then I will show 
the card to you again and identify the correct planet. Please 
do not mark your paper or change your choice after the correct 
planet is identified. It is important that you realize that 
while your task is to learn how to use the information pro-
vided, the information is of an uncertain nature. Just as 
with the cues that helped you to identify the basketball 
player, they may be correct most of the time, but may also 
be wrong on occasion. 
Each of the three classes: Moon, Mars, and Pluto 
are equally represented, that is, there are 21 spacemen from 
Moon, 21 from Mars, and 21 from Pluto. Do not make the 
mistake of assuming that the probability of any given space-
man belonging to a planet is 33%. The information on each 
card indicates a specific class membership with probabilities 
which MAY OR MAY NOT vary widely. 
Questions? 
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR TEST TRIALS 
We shall use probability to mean proportion or 
percentage. To begin with, consider a deck of 52 playing 
cards. We know that the cards in the deck are of several 
different kinds. Suppose that we are interested in spades 
as a kind of card. The probability of a spade in a deck is 
the number of times that this kind of card appears in the 
deck divided by the total number of cards in the deck. In 
other words, the proportion or percentage of cards that are 
spades. There are 13 spades in a deck of 52 cards. Thirteen 
is one-fourth of 52, so the probability of getting a spade is 
~, .25, or 25 percent. 
Now consider a bag of 100 marbles--50 black and 50 
white. What is the probability of getting a black marble? 
The black marbles make up one-half of all the marbles: there-
fore, the probability of getting a black one is ~, .SO, or 
50 percent. What is the probability of getting a green 
marble from the same sack? It is, of course, zero or no 
probability, since there are no green marbles in the sack. 
In a sack of 100 black marbles, what is the probability of 
getting a black marble? The answer is, of course, 1.00, 
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Probabilities and percentages are usually written with 
decimals as they were in the examples above, with 1.00 being 
designated as certainty. We are going to use 100 as the per-
fect probability or certainty just to keep from using deci-
mals. In other words, instead of writing .10 you will write 
10; instead of writing .90 you will write 90, and so on. 
When you are shown the information on these next cards 
you will make your estimates of probability by writing a 
number for each of the three planets. For each card, the 
three estimates MUST add }!£ _:!:£ 100. Please be sure to write 
down all three estimates for each card. 
Please look up to indicate that you have finished 
reading this. 
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR TEST TRIALS 
We shall use probability to mean proportion or per-
centage. To begin with, consider a deck of 52 playing cards. 
We know that the cards in the deck are of several different 
kinds. Suppose that we are interested in spades as a kind of 
card. The probability of a spade in the deck is the number 
of times that this kind of card appears in the deck divided 
by the total number of cards in the deck. In other words, 
the proportion or percentage of cards that are spades. There 
are 13 spades in a deck of 52 cards. Thirteen is one-fourth 
of 52, so the probability of getting a spade is ~, .25, or 
25 percent. Now consider a bag of 100 marbles--50 black and 
50 white. What is the probability of getting a black marble? 
The black marbles make up one-half of all the marbles; there-
fore, the probability of getting a black one is ~, .SO, or 
50 percent. What is the probability of getting a green mar-
ble from the same sack? It is, of course, zero or no proba-
bility, since there are no green marbles in the sack. In a 
sack of 100 black marbles, what is the probability of getting 
a black marble? The answer is, of course, 1.00, 100 percent, 
or certainty because all of the marbles are black. 
100 percent, or certainty because all of the marbles are 
black. 
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Probabilities and percentages are usually written 
with decimals as they were in the examples above, with 1.00 
being designated as certainty. We are going to use 100 as 
the perfect probability or certainty just to keep from using 
decimals. In other words, instead of writing .10 you will 
write 10; instead of writing .90 you will write 90 and so on. 
When you are shown the information on these next cards 
you will make an estimate of probability by making a mark on 
the straight line indicating the full range of probability 
for each planet. Next, you will place a number by your mark 
showing the number value of your estimate. Please make a 
mark and a number estimate for each of the three planets for 
each test card. 
Please look up to indicate that you have finished 
reading this. 
85 
Test Trials (Oral) 
I will show you a card and ask you to estimate the 
probability that the information you see is an indicator for 
each of the three classes. The card will remain in view 
during all three estimates. It will work like this 
I will ask you to make an estimate for Mars, Pluto, and Moon. 
You will have 20 seconds and then we will go on to the next 
card. Here is a sample card to be sure you understand. 
Please mark your answers under the sample trial on your 
answer sheet. 
Questions? 
1-12. Estimate the probability that the 
~~~~~~~-
indicates a spaceman is from Mars, Pluto, or Moon. 
